Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 22

Issue 3

Article 8

1934

Corporations. ultra vires Liability for Acts Within Apparent Scope
of Authority of Agents
J. Mapother
Jefferson Circuit Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons

Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
Mapother, J. (1934) "Corporations. ultra vires Liability for Acts Within Apparent Scope of Authority of
Agents," Kentucky Law Journal: Vol. 22: Iss. 3, Article 8.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol22/iss3/8

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Kentucky Law Journal by an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact
UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.

CORPORATIONS. ULTRA VIRES. LIABILITY FOR ACTS
WITHIN APPARENT SCOPE OF AUTHORITY
OF AGENTS.*
JEFFERSON CmcUIT CoURT
Commox Pms BRANoH
SEcoND DivLwoN
No. 229736

Tim C. J. Km

COM N,

Plaintiff,

VS.
EMMART PACKING COMPANY,

Defendant.

OPINION
At the time involved in this lawsuit the defendant, Emmart
Plaeking Company, was a corporation, and its "Magnolia'"
brand of meats widely advertised. J. M. Emmart was its
president. The corporation defendant admittedly employed
plaintiff to supply material and labor at its plant on Story
Avenue in Louisville, of the value of more than $2,000.00.
During the course of such employment the defendant corporation similarly contracted with plaintiff for other work and
material, amounting to nearly $800.00, to be installed at Magnolia Cafeteria, in another portion of the city, and defendant
supplied certain of its workmen to assist plaintiff in its installation there. The entire account, covering both jobs, was
charged by plaintiff to defendant corporation, which issued
its checks to plaintiff in payment therefor until the balance
due thereon was reduced to $305.55, for recovery of which
plaintiff sues herein. Its itemized account, attached to petition,
covers the job done at the Magnolia Cafeteria.
The answer of defendant is a traverse, and its proof was
to the effect that plaintiff's service at Magnolia Cafeteria was
not for the benefit of defendant corporation but for its then
*This Is one of a series of opinions of circuit judges and federal
district judges on questions of law, many of which have not been passed
upon by the Kentucky Court of Appeals. This opinion is by Judge
Thomas C. Mapother, of the Common Pleas Branch, Second Division,
Jefferson Circuit Court, Louisville, Kentucky.
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president, J. M. Emmart, who was the sole owner of the Magnolia Cafeteria; that in front of that establishment was a
large electric sign showing J. M. Emmart as its proprietor;
and that, while all payments on the account were made to
plaintiff by vouchers of the corporation defendant, notations
appear on the back thereof showing that they were for the
account of Magnolia Cafeteria. No witness testified that when
the account was contracted, nor at any other time prior to
default in payment, was the plaintiff told that it was to extend
credit therefor to J. M. Emmart or the Magnolia Cafeteria,
nor that it was to look for payment to other than the corporation defendant with which it had steadily dealt at all times.
The nearest approach to such testimony was a statement by
the witness Hilton, in the employ of defendant corporation at
the time, that certain of its officials were in 'doubt about
whether to order this work done at Magnolia Cafeteria, and
he, Hilton, was asked to consult its president, J. M. Emmart,
on the subject; that he then and there went alone into the
private office of President Emmart, who authorized it to be
done; whereupon he came out and communicated that fact to
agents of both plaintiff and defendant who were present together at the time, and plaintiff's agent was then and there
directed in substance to go ahead with the work. While Hilton
did attempt to say that plaintiff knew it was doing this work
for the Magnolia Cafeteria and not for the Emmart Packing
Company, he did not testify to a single fact even tending to
so indicate, or at least indicating that it was contracted for
Emmart individually, to the exclusion of the corporation defendant; and plaintiff's testimony is that, while it of course
knew it was to do the work at Magnolia Cafeteria, it knew
no one but the corporation defendant in connection with the
contract for the work and knew nothing of the ownership of
Magnolia Cafeteria. J. M. Emmart undertook to "take the
rap" by testifying that the debt was incurred for his benefit
and not for that of the corporation, but he did not say that
he contracted it individually, nor did he testify to facts indicating that plaintiff had any reason to look to him, for payment. The parties who negotiated with plaintiff were admittedly
authorized agents of the corporation; and if otherwise, its
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acceptance of the work and payment for more than half of it
would amount to ratification. The Court accordingly at trial
time took the view that defendant corporation, having contracted the debt and having paid more than half of it, was
obligated for the balance, and so instructed the jury peremptorily.
The sole question then and now presented is whether the
contract, under all the circumstances, was ultra vires-beyond
the power of the corporation-and it is therefore absolved from
payment. Assuredly there are limitations upon the powers
of corporations as well as limitations upon the authority of
their agents. They know these limitations better than anyone else, and if they can repudiate every unauthorized act
they perform in dealing with the public, what chance has the
latter? The public has no concern with and is not bound by
their private and undisclosed reasons for what they do. A
corporation can do business only by agents, and the general
test of its liability for the acts of the latter is not whether
they are authorized, but whether they are within the apparent
scope of authority. Corporations are as much liable for their
mistakes as are individuals. Defendant says it did not receive
any benefit from the work done at Magnolia Cafeteria, but it
manifested sufficient interest therein to contract for and supply its own agents to help install it, thereby causing plaintiff
to render the service involved. The fact that defendant contracted for the work was an affirmative representation by it
that it was interested therein, and plaintiff had the right to
assume such interest. Payments were made by defendant corporation on the account until it tired thereof, and the only,
reason the record discloses for so tiring is that it was told
by its officers in authority not to make any more payments
but let Emmart take care of it himself. The plaintiff had done
other work for the corporation, was called to the office of the
corporation for the purpose of contracting for the work involved herein, and its president, in authorizing the work to be
done, was speaking for the corporation when he failed to make
it perfectly clear tbat he was doing so as an individual. Plaintiff, being engaged in serving the corporation when it received
word from its president that further service was required, had
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the right to treat it as service to the corporation, even though
it was to be performed at the Magnolia Cafeteria, in the absence
of clear direction to plaintiff that it was to be done for its
president individually and on his credit.
Even if plaintiff knew that the Magnolia Cafeteria was
reputedly owned by its president, the corporation migbt still
have had a private and legitimate and profitable interest in
furthering its prosperous operation, for the purpose of advertising its own products, or as the brewers used to install bar
fixtures in corner saloons in order to hold their trade, or for
other undisclosed reasons.
The proof for defendant indicates that, while plaintiff was
not so told at the time, the order for this work was given
by it for the mere accommodation of its president, and that
it charged the amount of the account to its president on its
books, reimbursing itself from funds accumulating to the credit
of its president, and issuing its voucher to plaintiff in payment which bore notations that it was on account of Magnolia
Cafeteria. 2laintiff was under no obligation to observe these
notations, and, if observed, they merely identified the particular job involved. Plaintiff had already parted with its labor and
materials on the faith of its credit extended to the corporation defendant, and to allow the latter to accept and meet
more than half of the obligation and abandon the plaintiff
in midstream, attempting to saddle the balance individually
on its president, with whom the plaintiff had no contract, would
seem violative of every principle of commercial law and justice. Indications are thaf the corporation was imposed upon
by its president, but if the view contended for by defendant
prevails, both used the corporation to impose upon the public.
As between these two views the Court is committed to the
first, and can give effect thereto only by making the corporation
bear the loss. If there was a question of collusion between
plaintiff and defendant's then president to assist the latter
in swindling defendant corporation, we would have a different
case; but the good faith of plaintiff is not impugned.
Defendant cites in support of its position the following
authorities:
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Basnick v. W. M. Ritter Lumber Co., 187 Ky. 523;
Main Street Tobacco Whse. Co. v. Bain Moore Tobacco Co., 198
Ky. 777;
Farmers' & Traders' Bank v. Thixton, Millett d Uo., 199 Ky. 69.

In the Rasnick case plaintiff had sued the defendant corporation's doctor and its bookkeeper and *store manager individually for damages for slander and negligence in medical
treatment. Plaintiff alleged that the superintendent of defendant corporation, claiming that its work was hindered by
said suits, agreed for the corporation, in consideration of their
dismissal, to give plaintiff a job with the corporation, and
failed and refused to do so, thus violating its contract with
plaintiff, to the damage of the latter. A demurrer was sustained to the petition, and judgment affirmed, the upper court
holding that the petition showed no consideration for the contract ixor authority in its superintendent, Kopp, to make it.
The Court referred to consideration as: "A benefit to the party
promising, or a loss or detriment to the party to whom the
promise is made." It would seem that parting with something
of value, as the plaintiff did in the case on trial, would come
squarely within that definition. But the Court also held, what
was manifest from the facts of that case, that a lumber corporation is without power to compromise lawsuits not filed
against it, and that even if it had, such action is not within
the apparent scope of the authority of its superintendent.
In the second case above cited, Cain, a bookkeeper for the
Main Street Tobacco Warehouse Co., told the secretary of
plaintiff over the telephone that his company would honor a
certain draft of one Bitz and also honor future drafts drawn
by litz for tobacco purchased by him. It appeared that the
Main Street Tobacco Warehouse Co. only bought and sold
tobacco on commission but that its president, Dannenhold, personally bought for himself and others; that Dannenhold had
arranged with Ritz to buy for him personally certain tobacco,
and as a matter of convenience directed hn to draw on the
Main Street Tobacco Warehouse Co., which was done, and Dannenhold reimbursed the company; that Cain, the bookkeeper,
was without authority to pass on contracts for the corporation.
It was held that a bookeeper ordinarily has only authority to
make such entries of record as he is directed to make, and
not to make contracts for the company. It was also held that
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the authorization by Dannenhold, its president, to Hitz to draw
two drafts on the corporation did not carry with it the right
of Hitz to keep this up indefinitely, nor to draw the one involved in that case. If Dannenhold or other agents of the
corporation, by his direction, had purchased the tobacco involved and charged it to the corporation of which he was president, and caused it to be delivered at a certain place, and the
corporation had actually paid for half of it, that case would
be more like the one under submission.
In the third case above cited, Thixton, Millett & Co., a
corporation, became accommodation endorser on a note for P. D.
O'Bryan to the appellant bank.
Such action was held
ultra vires and void as beyond the power of the corporation
under its charter. O'Bryan traded a poolroom for a saloon in
Owensboro, and Thixton, Millett & Co. endorsed his note for
the money required to complete the deal: The question presented was: "May a trading corporation such as Thixton,
Millett & Co., organized for a definite and specific purpose,
with its powers and specifications set forth in its charter, become an accommodation endorser for another without consideration?" The Court's answer was no, and it would seem that
a banker ought to know as much. If, however, Thixton, Millett & Co. had in fact purchased the contents of the saloon in
its own name and executed its note therefor to the seller, can
it be doubted that it would have been liable thereon? And
would it, after making payments on the obligation, and being
sued for a balance due, have been let out on a showing that it
made the purchase for the accommodation of its president individually? If so, the public simply cannot know where it
stands with reference to corporate obligations. The Court is
cited to no authority for such conclusion, and is convinced that
in principle it is not legally sound.
While a corporation cannot become a surety or guarantor
for, or otherwise lends its credit to another, persons with whom
it contracts such obligations are entitled to know that it is
doing so in order to become the victims of such rule. To permit a corporation to contract ostensibly for itself concerning
an ordinary transaction like the one we have here, and at
settling time tell its creditor, who extended credit to it on the
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faith of such agreement, that it was in reality doing so for
the benefit of another without authority and must therefore be
held excused, is more than I am able to approve.
W ile this Court, wherever possible, favors the decision of
differences between litigants on substantial legal merit rather
than on technicalities of practice, and its views above expressed,
whether sound or erroneous, are directed at such result, the
answer of defendant herein would seem not to support its
defense of ultra vires, which must be specially pleaded.
Louisville Tobacco Whse. Co. v. Stewart, 70 S. W. 285; 24 K. L. R.
934;

Greene v. Middlesboro Tobacco Co., 61 S. W. 288; 22 K. L. R. 1715;
Kentucky Lumber Co. v. Greene, 87 Ky. 257;
Martin v. Ky. Land Investment Co., 146 Ky. 525.

With such defense eliminated, the only issue remaining is
whether defendant in fact incurred the obligation involved, and
on this thbe evidence was all one way-that it did.
The motion of defendant for a new trial will be accordingly overruled, with exception for it and 60 days for a bill
of exceptions.
MAPOTBM, J.

